

# Shared Representations for Working Memory and Mental Imagery in Early Visual Cortex

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## Summary

Early visual areas contain specific information about visual items maintained in working memory, suggesting a role for early visual cortex in more complex cognitive functions [1–4]. It is an open question, however, whether these areas also underlie the ability to internally generate images de novo (i.e., mental imagery). Research on mental imagery has to this point focused mostly on whether mental images activate early sensory areas, with mixed results [5–7]. Recent studies suggest that multivariate pattern analysis of neural activity patterns in visual regions can reveal content-specific representations during cognitive processes, even though overall activation levels are low [1–4]. Here, we used this approach [8, 9] to study item-specific activity patterns in early visual areas (V1–V3) when these items are internally generated. We could reliably decode stimulus identity from neural activity patterns in early visual cortex during both working memory and mental imagery. Crucially, these activity patterns resembled those evoked by bottom-up visual stimulation, suggesting that mental images are indeed “perception-like” in nature. These findings suggest that the visual cortex serves as a dynamic “blackboard” [10, 11] that is used during both bottom-up stimulus processing and top-down internal generation of mental content.

## Results

Here we investigated whether early sensory regions are recruited similarly during the maintenance of previously presented images (i.e., visual working memory [1, 12]), the internal generation of images that have not been presented (i.e., mental imagery [13]), and the perception of visual material [14–17]. We used a multivariate analysis approach [8, 9] to determine the information contained in the spatial patterns of fMRI responses. Participants (N = 24) either kept a grating stimulus in mind (working memory [WM] trials) or internally generated a new stimulus by mentally rotating a grating and subsequently held this new image in their mind’s eye for a 10 s period (imagery [IM] trials; see Figure 1). Crucially, during the IM task, the image kept in mind was not a representation of the physically presented grating but was generated de novo by mentally transforming the stimulus material. Behavioral data confirmed that the participants could successfully perform both tasks, with increasing reaction times as a function of the amount of mental transformation (see Figure S1 available

online). We defined early visual cortical areas (V1, V2, and V3) using standard retinotopic mapping routines and extracted activity patterns in these regions as the mental imagery process unfolded.

First, we assessed whether the activity pattern in early visual cortex during the working memory period in WM trials reflected the stimulus orientation (three possibilities: 15°, 75°, 135°) that was maintained by the participants, using a WM-trained classifier and a leave-one-run-out cross-validation approach. We found that early visual cortex (V1–V3) indeed contained information about maintained content [WM: decoding accuracy 54%, chance level 33.3%:  $t(23) = 5.88$ ,  $p < 1 \times 10^{-5}$ ] in the period 8–12 s after onset of maintenance). This increase is comparable in size to that observed in earlier studies [1], reflects a medium-to-large effect size (Cohen’s  $d = 1.21$ ) [18], and replicates the finding that early visual cortex contains memory representations in the absence of stimulus input [1–4]. To investigate whether the same voxels in early visual cortex also contained information about images that were internally generated and subsequently maintained, we repeated this procedure with an IM-trained classifier applied to IM trials. Indeed, early visual cortex also contained information about internally generated images [IM: decoding accuracy 46%,  $t(23) = 3.09$ ,  $p = 0.005$ , Cohen’s  $d = 0.63$ ], indicating involvement of the visual cortex during mental imagery. Moreover, activity patterns for WM and IM trials were highly similar: when training the multivariate pattern classifier on the delay period during WM and testing on the delay period during IM, we found equally reliable pattern information [WM → IM decoding accuracy 45%,  $t(23) = 3.88$ ,  $p < 1 \times 10^{-3}$ , Cohen’s  $d = 0.78$ ]. Training on IM and testing on WM also resulted in reliable classification [IM → WM decoding accuracy 45%,  $t(23) = 4.13$ ,  $p < 1 \times 10^{-3}$ , Cohen’s  $d = 0.83$ ]. All of these effects were also present when we looked at V1, V2, and V3 separately (Table S1; all accuracies > 39%, all  $p < 0.007$ ).

The similarity between neural representations during WM and IM does not necessarily mean that these representations are “perceptual” in nature (i.e., resemble the bottom-up activity patterns evoked during actual perception), because bottom-up and top-down signals could be encoded differently in early visual cortex [19, 20], or the patterns could reflect some other aspect of the task, such as attention. To test the perceptual nature of these representations, we obtained activity patterns during the actual perception of gratings and trained a classifier to discriminate the orientation of these gratings. Since participants performed a task at fixation during the perception of the gratings, these activity patterns chiefly reflected bottom-up, stimulus-related activity, while the potential effects of top-down attentional processes were reduced by providing subjects with a task at fixation. This “perceptual” classifier could also reliably discriminate between activity patterns in early visual cortex evoked by the different orientations during both WM trials [decoding accuracy 46%,  $t(23) = 4.50$ ,  $p < 1 \times 10^{-4}$ , Cohen’s  $d = 0.90$ ] and IM trials [decoding accuracy 49%,  $t(23) = 5.92$ ,  $p < 1 \times 10^{-5}$ , Cohen’s  $d = 1.21$ ]. This indicates that not only does the early visual cortex contain information about internally generated images during IM, the activity patterns for these images are similar to those evoked

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


Figure 1. Experimental Design

At the start of each trial, a task cue indicated whether participants had to maintain a stimulus in working memory (WM; top row) or create a new stimulus by imagining rotating the stimulus grating and keeping the ensuing mental image in their mind's eye (mental imagery [IM]; bottom row). During IM trials, mental rotation could be clockwise or counterclockwise (as indicated by arrow direction), and 60° or 120° (as indicated by the number of arrows). After the task cue, two gratings (out of three possible stimuli: 15°, 75°, or 115°) were presented briefly, followed by a second stimulus cue (A or B, denoting the first or second stimulus, respectively) that indicated which stimulus grating to select and maintain (WM) or rotate and then imagine (IM). After a 10 s delay period in which participants were asked to vividly imagine the relevant stimulus, a probe was presented. Participants indicated whether the probe was rotated clockwise or counterclockwise with respect to the stimulus they had kept in mind and received feedback on each trial. See also Figure S1.


during actual perception. Interestingly, decoding accuracy was higher for people who could more accurately form mental images during both tasks (WM:  $\rho = -0.51$ ,  $p = 0.0053$ ; IM:  $\rho = -0.37$ ,  $p = 0.039$ ; Figure S2), providing a strong link between mental imagery ability and the precision of population-level responses [21, 22].

The generalization of the content-specific patterns between bottom-up stimulation and top-down internal generation suggests that similar neural codes are used during these processes in early sensory cortex. To examine the time course of this process and assess whether early visual cortex sequentially represents the initial and final target image (cf. [23]), we analyzed activity patterns in early visual cortex at each time point as the task unfolded, using the independent classifier that was trained on stimulus-driven activity. During WM trials, the classifier was initially at chance, selecting each option approximately one-third of the time. After stimulus presentation, visual cortical (V1–V3) activity patterns reflected a combination of the two presented gratings. Subsequently, the cued (i.e., to be remembered) grating was predominantly selected by the classifier (Figure 2A). Similarly, during IM trials, initial visual cortical activity patterns after stimulus presentation reflected the two presented gratings, but not the unrepresented grating (Figures 2B and 2C). Again, shortly after this, the cued (i.e., starting orientation that had to be mentally rotated) grating was predominantly selected by the classifier. Crucially, however, there was a gradual shift from a representation of the

cued (starting) grating toward a representation of the internally generated target grating. This target grating was not physically presented on that trial but was mentally created by the participants and after several seconds became the preferred orientation of the classifier. This suggests three sequential stages of representation in early visual cortex during the mental imagery process: first, the physically presented stimuli are represented; second, one of the presented stimuli is selected for transformation; and third, a new representation is formed in early visual cortex.

The time courses of decoding accuracy for the target grating further support this notion (Figure 3A). During WM, the target could be decoded as early as 4 s after delay-period onset, whereas during IM the target could only be decoded from 8 s after delay-period onset. This delay likely reflects a combination of factors. During imagery trials, participants had to not only select the cued grating but also retrieve the task cue, which instructed them about the direction and extent of mental rotation. They subsequently had to perform the mental rotation, with each of these steps contributing to the delay in the formation of the internally generated target image. The patterns in Figures 2 and 3 suggest that participants mentally transformed the image early in the trial, rather than at the time of the probe. Again, similar patterns were present in V1–V3 in isolation.

There was a dissociation between the time course of stimulus representation and the time course of mean neural activity



**Figure 2. Temporal Unfolding of Mental Representations**  
Proportion of classifier choice when testing V1–V3 combined (360 voxels), averaged over the 24 participants. Error bars denote SEM; dashed line indicates chance level (33.3%).

in the early visual regions (Figure 3B). While information about maintained (WM) or internally generated (IM) stimuli increased over the delay interval, overall neural activity decreased, in line with previous work on visual working memory [1]. This stresses the difference between overall activation and information content within activation patterns and puts the results of previous studies that looked only at overall activity levels of sensory cortex during mental imagery in a new perspective. Although early sensory areas did not show robust delay-related activity, there were several other areas outside visual cortex that showed a robust and sustained neural activity increase during the delay period of both IM and WM trials (Figure S3; Table S2), including bilateral parietal and prefrontal cortex, as well as the pre-supplementary motor area. To investigate whether these areas also contained stimulus-related information, we used the same classification approach that we employed for early visual areas. Interestingly, although some of these regions within this network (notably the left parietal cortex and supplementary motor area) showed some evidence of stimulus information when training and testing within the main experiment (Table S2), generalization from the perceptual classifier to the main task resulted in chance-level performance (all  $p > 0.05$ ).

### Discussion

In this study, we used a multivariate pattern analysis approach to directly compare neural representations during visual perception, working memory and mental imagery, in retinotopically defined early visual cortex. We found that activity patterns in early visual areas (V1–V3) could reliably predict which of three oriented gratings was either held in working memory or mentally imagined, even though overall levels of neural activity were low. We observed similar neural activity patterns during periods in which participants either kept visual material in working memory (WM) or internally generated a visual stimulus (IM) by mentally transforming it, as shown by similarly high decoding performance within and between tasks. Crucially, by training on patterns of activity during physical presentation of gratings, we show that activity patterns during mental imagery resemble those elicited by physically presented stimuli, suggesting analogous neural codes for internally generated mental images and stimulus representations. The results are in line with other recent findings of representational content in the visual cortex during high-level cognitive processes [1, 24, 25].

Together, our results suggest that early visual areas may serve as a dynamic “blackboard” that supports information

(A) Classifier choice over time during WM trials. Activity patterns during the first time point (2 s after WM onset) show a mixture of the two physically presented stimuli (red and pink lines), but not unseen grating, after which the pattern activity was consistently classified as the cued grating (pink line). (B) Classifier choice over time during IM trials. On these trials, participants mentally rotated the cued stimulus toward the not-physically-presented grating orientation. Again, activity patterns during the first time point (2 s after IM onset) show a mixture of the two physically presented stimuli (red and pink lines), while the not-presented grating is the least selected. Thereafter, there is a gradual switch in classifier choice from the cued grating (pink) to the generated target grating (blue). (C) Classifier choice over time during IM trials. On these trials, participants mentally rotated the cued stimulus toward the presented but uncued grating orientation. A transition in the representation occurred ~8 s after delay period onset, from the cued grating (pink line) to the created grating that was similar to the presented but uncued grating (red line). See also Figure S2 and Table S1.




Figure 3. Time Course of Decoding Accuracy and Mean Neural Activity in V1–V3

(A) Time course of decoding accuracy was different for WM (black line) and IM (red line). Accurate decoding of the target image was achieved several seconds later in time for IM than for WM trials, due to the intermediate mental operation. Decoding was significant from 4 to 16 s for WM trials and from 8 to 16 s for IM trials (all  $p < 0.001$ ). Error bars denote SEM, dashed line indicates chance level (33.3%), and asterisks indicate significant decoding accuracy ( $p < 0.001$ ) for WM (black) and IM (red) or a significant difference between the two (gray).

(B) Time course of mean neural activity was indistinguishable between WM (black) and IM (red), as indicated by average blood oxygen level-dependent amplitude time course (averaged over the 360 selected voxels) with respect to average activity immediately preceding trial onset. Neural activity peaked ~4 s after presentation of the stimuli and again ~4 s after presentation of the probe, while activity declined in the delay period between the two presentations. Error bars denote SEM. See also Figure S3 and Table S2.

processing during both bottom-up and top-down processes [10, 23, 26]. This fits with proposals that view the primary visual cortex not simply as an entry station for subsequent cortical computations in higher-order visual areas but rather as a high-resolution buffer in the visual system that is recruited for several visual computations [11, 24, 26].

These findings also speak to an age-old debate about the nature of mental content [13, 16]. Depictive theories of mental content stress the overlap between representations during perception and mental imagery. Studies that assessed whether mental images activate primary sensory areas, as proposed by “depictive” theorists, have provided mixed results [5–7, 27]. By showing that there is content-specific overlap of activation patterns during mental imagery and bottom-up visual stimulation in primary visual cortex, we show that mental imagery partly depends on the same mechanisms as visual perception, in line with depictive accounts of mental representations [20].

An open issue relates to the role of nonsensory areas in the maintenance and internal generation of sensory material. Although we observed strong increases in activity in a specific set of regions in prefrontal and parietal cortex [28], we and others [3] did not find reliable encoding of stimulus-related information in these areas when training on perceptual input. This suggests that although it is very possible that these nonvisual areas contain stimulus representations, their format appears distinct from the automatic, bottom-up representation evoked by visual stimulation. Studies using neural recordings in monkeys have observed coding of individual stimuli in prefrontal cortex [29] and content-specific synchronization of activity across the frontal parietal network [30] during visual working memory. Interestingly, we also obtained evidence for some stimulus-related information in parietal and frontal regions when comparing stimulus-specific patterns within the main tasks (IM and WM). Together, these results suggest complementary roles for early visual cortex and frontoparietal regions [30–32], whereby frontoparietal regions create flexible stimulus representations that are in line with behavioral goals [3, 33]. However, the exact role and representational content of the frontoparietal regions during mental imagery remain to be determined.

The generalization of stimulus information from stimulus-driven activity patterns to mental imagery-induced activity patterns in early visual cortex suggests a common representation of bottom-up and top-down signals in these cortical areas. It should be noted here that generalization was robust but not perfect, which may be due to the fact that internally generated images can lead to less robust and more variable activation patterns than bottom-up visual stimulation, due to internal fluctuations in attentional state. These fluctuations are likely reduced during the perceptual localizer, although it is also possible here that subjects still paid some attention to the stimuli (even though they performed a task at fixation). The current task design makes it unlikely that eye movements contributed to the decoding of imagined orientations. First, we trained the classifier on the independent localizer, during which participants had to perform a task at fixation. Second, the stimulus gratings were presented very briefly (200 ms), too short for systematic eye movement preparation and execution. Additionally, the relevant grating was only cued after the stimulus presentation [1].

It may seem surprising that overall neural activity levels appeared low during mental imagery and working memory, even though the patterns in early visual cortex carried stimulus information during this period. One reason for this may be that visual areas also exhibit an overall high level of spontaneous activity during rest [34], the functional significance of which may be quite similar to mental imagery [35]. Indeed, a recent developmental study [36] showed that spontaneous fluctuations in visual regions become increasingly similar to

stimulus-evoked patterns, suggesting that activity patterns in visual cortex may constitute an internal model that continuously adapts to expected upcoming input. Evidence for such an internal, predictive model of the world in early visual regions has also been obtained recently in humans [37]. Building on this, mental imagery might entail the generation of such an internal model, with top-down biasing signals projecting to visual areas in order to sharpen upcoming perception, leading to a similar overall level of activation in visual regions during imagery and rest. The idea that mental imagery plays a functional role in facilitating future perception is supported by a recent study that found that mental imagery biases subsequent perception in a binocular rivalry task [35, 38], as well as by the correlation between IM performance and representational precision (Figure S2).

In conclusion, we observed analogous sensory representations during visual working memory and mental imagery in early visual cortex. Crucially, these activity patterns resembled those evoked by bottom-up visual stimulation, suggesting that mental images are “perception-like” in nature. These findings provide empirical support for the notion that visual cortex acts as a blackboard that is used during both bottom-up stimulus processing and top-down internal generation of mental content.

#### Experimental Procedures

The experimental procedures are summarized briefly throughout the Results and are presented in complete detail in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.

#### Supplemental Information

Supplemental Information includes three figures, two tables, and Supplemental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.05.065>.

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